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Regression and neural network models of wage determination are constructed where the 
explanatory variables include detailed information about the impact of school curricula on 
future earnings. It is established that there are strong nonlinearities and interaction effects 
present in the relationship between curriculum and earnings. The results have important 
implications in the context of the human capital versus signalling and screening debate. They 
also throw light on contemporary policy issues concerning the desirability of breadth versus 
depth in the school curriculum.  
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 Introduction 
Since the seminal work of Schultz (1961), Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974), the human 
capital model has dominated economic discussions about education. The signalling model, 
developed by Spence (1974), and the screening model of Arrow (1973) have provided the 
human capital model with competitors which are theoretically plausible.
1 But the weight of 
empirical evidence supports the view that schooling does result in learning which in turn 
raises worker productivity and earnings. For instance, Wolpin (1977), Cohn et al. (1987), and 
Johnes (1998) all find no evidence that self-employed workers (who have no need to use 
education as a sorting mechanism) have lower returns to educational investments than do 
other workers.
2 And Grubb (1993), Cohn et al. (1987) and Johnes (1998) find that the returns 
to education are as strong amongst older workers as they are amongst younger workers, 
despite the fact that employers presumably have learned something about the productivity of 
those employees who have long tenure. 
 
One piece of evidence exists that points in the other direction. The work of Altonji (1995) 
suggests that, while years of schooling are rewarded by higher earnings in the labour market, 
the number and nature of courses taken while at school is not. This would seem to indicate 
that employers use years of schooling as a signal or screen, and that productivity and wages 
do not depend on the instructional content of those years. 
 
This work is partially reinforced by other studies, notably Levine and Zimmerman (1995), 
Vignoles (1999) and Dolton and Vignoles (2002a,b), which have found – both in the United 
                                                 
1 In a broader context, signalling is an important phenomenon wherever there are asymmetries in information. It 
is therefore often associated with principal-agent models. Recent surveys of this literature include Riley (2001). 
The present paper is linked to this literature inasmuch as it provides an empirical test of signalling as a response 
to asymmetric information in one particular context - that of the labour market. 
2 As Hanushek (1986) notes, the test used in these papers may be unreliable in the presence of sample selection 
bias. 
  2States and the United Kingdom – that mathematics is the only secondary school subject which 
subsequently makes a significantly positive contribution to earnings. If these arguments are 
accepted, then any curriculum which does not include mathematics does not contribute to 
increased productivity – though the evidence of numerous studies demonstrates that the extra 
period of schooling does lead to increased  earnings, presumably through sorting effects.
3  
 
These results, contradictory as they are, warrant closer inspection. In the present paper, I use 
data from the UK to examine the impact which post-compulsory curriculum has on earnings. 
The method used here represents an advance on earlier studies because I use new, nonlinear 
methods of estimation which take full account of the synergies which might exist between the 
subjects that a student reads within the school curriculum. To anticipate the results, I shall 
demonstrate that synergy does matter in the context of curriculum, and that mathematics is not 




The United Kingdom provides a particularly instructive laboratory for examining the effects 
of curriculum, since a system of national examinations well suited to this type of analysis is in 
place. These are taken at age 16 (the General Certificate of Secondary Education, or formerly 
the Ordinary – ‘O’ – level) and at age 18 (the Advanced – ‘A’ – level).
5 The former cover a 
                                                 
3 There is also a sociological literature concerning curriculum and school performance, typified by the 
contributions of Adelman (1999) and Alexander and Pallas (1984). But this does not focus on labour market 
outcomes. 
4 This supposes that it is legitimate to follow Altonji (1995) in assuming that employers perceive years of 
education attained but not details of the curriculum undertaken between the ages of 16 and 18. In a highly co-
ordinated educational system such as Britain's, however, curriculum itself might be treated as a signal by 
employers. But, having researched the NCDS data, Dolton and Vignoles (2002a) conclude that 'it is the specific 
skills and knowledge provided … that attracts a wage premium'. In other words, they find against the argument 
that curriculum serves as a signal. I concur. For more on the relationship between job market signalling and 
curriculum, see Altonji (1995) and Dolton and Vignoles (2002a). 
5 Before the creation of the GCSE examinations in 1988, pupils took subject-specific O level examinations or the 
less demanding Certificate of Secondary Education (CSE) examinations. Those who passed the CSE with an 
  3broad range of subjects, but from age 16 onwards, British pupils choose a relatively 
specialised curriculum. Until the year 2000 cohort of entrants to post-compulsory education, 
students in the 16-18 year age group have typically taken 3 A level examinations; in other 
words, from age 16 to age 18, they study just three subject areas.
6 The returns to curricula of 
many different types can therefore be estimated by looking at the experience of a variety of 
students who choose different subject mixes. In particular, it is possible to investigate the 
extent to which benefits accrue to students pursuing a narrow curriculum – for instance, 3 arts 
subjects or 3 science subjects – vis-à-vis those which attach to a broader curriculum in which 
arts and science subjects are mixed.  
 
It is important to note that all the examinations referred to above are national qualifications, 
designed to evaluate pupils' performance in a range of subjects each of which is taught 
according to a national curriculum. The examinations are administered by a small number of 
examination boards that operate at national level - pupils do not therefore sit examinations 
that are set or graded by their own teachers. The examinations are widely regarded, 
internationally, as providing a reliable measure of pupil performance.
7  
 
The analysis of curriculum effects is of particular interest in the context of changes which are 
currently under way in the British system of post-compulsory secondary education. Since 
2000, those studying at this level have been able to take some combination of Advanced 
Subsidiary (AS) and A2 level qualifications. The former entail one year of study, while the 
                                                                                                                                                         
achievement level of grade 1 were deemed to have demonstrated achievement equivalent to a pass at O level. 
Where I refer to O level passes in the sequel, I therefore take this to include CSE grade 1 passes. 
6 The move toward modular courses and the Curriculum 2000 reforms mean that the A levels taken by my 
sample (for the most part, in 1976) differ from those that students take now. But the insights that the analysis 
affords into the role played by curriculum in the accumulation of human capital are nonetheless likely to be 
generally valid.  
7 Further information on the structure of examinations in the British system is provided by Dolton and Vignoles 
(2002b).  
  4latter are comparable to the A levels which have existed heretofore. The intention of the new 
scheme is that students might take a mix of courses which provide depth (an A2 qualification) 
in one or two subjects, but breadth (a larger number of AS qualifications) elsewhere. The 
increased breadth which this new system will encourage is widely regarded as a move in the 
right direction because comparisons with other countries indicate that British students have 
specialised early. Whether the changes are truly likely to prove beneficial is, of course, an 
empirical issue, however. Vignoles (1999), using similar data but different methods to those 
used here, has argued that more breadth is not what the labour market appears to want.  A 
byproduct of the results reported in the present paper is to provide useful additional input into 
this debate. 
 
In the remainder of this paper, I propose a method whereby the effects of curriculum on 
labour market returns can be evaluated. A novel feature of this analysis is that it uses a neural 
network approach to allow for nonlinearities and interaction effects. The next section 
describes the method, the following section describes the data, and this is followed by a 




Begin by postulating an extremely simple model of wage determination, where 
 
ln w = Zβ + f(x)   +   u           ( 1 )  
 
Here w represents the wage paid to an individual, Z is a vector of individual characteristics, x 
is a vector of binary variables which indicates for each subject whether a qualification has 
  5been obtained by the individual, and u is an error.
8 The simplest model to consider would be 
one in which f is a linear function, and I report estimates of such a model in the sequel.  
 
In general, such an approach would be unnecessarily restrictive, however. Standard linear 
models suppose that each subject affects the wage in a manner which is independent of the 
other subjects studied. It would be entirely plausible to suggest that the manner in which 
subjects combine together is also important in determining a worker’s subsequent labour 
market productivity and wage. For instance, the breadth afforded by a curriculum which 
contains Mathematics, Social Science and  History might render such a curriculum worth 
more than the sum of its parts. Indeed, this notion is implicit in much recent government 
policy in the United Kingdom, particularly the Curriculum 2000 reforms. In order to capture 
the nonlinearity and synergy which is implied by the above argument, I adopt a neural 
network modelling approach in which  
 






where m is the number of neurodes in the (single) hidden layer and n is the number of 
different qualifications which it is possible to gain.
9  
 
                                                 
8 I do not explore interactions between the x and Z vectors. This is, of course, a feature of the present analysis 
that is common to all earlier, linear, studies of the effect of curriculum on subsequent earnings. While it would be 
possible to include the Z in the neural network, this would make the results of the analysis extremely difficult to 
interpret, and it is for this reason that that option has been eschewed here.  
9 In one respect, it could be claimed that the neural network specification is a highly restrictive functional form, 
not a flexible form at all. This view is somewhat akin to the claim that a television picture is not a picture at all 
but rather a matrix of dots. To push this analogy a little further, note that it would be possible in principle to 
model curriculum using a set of binary variables – one for each possible combination of 3 A level subjects. But 
this would lead to severe degrees of freedom problems. The neural network approach finesses this issue, and 
permits identification, by imposing a parametric specification on the manifold. So, while the flexibility of the 
neural network and its property as a universal approximator (White et al., 1989) are appealing, here I am 
exploiting the parametric nature of the method. 
  6It is instructive to think of this neural network by reference to Figure 1, where I consider the 
case of a single hidden layer feedforward network with (n=) 4 inputs, a single output and (m=) 
5 nodes in the hidden layer. Signals pass from neurode to neurode within the network. In the 
present case, these signals flow unidirectionally - that is, they enter the system as inputs, pass 
through successive layers of neurodes, and then exit as outputs. There are no feedback loops.  
The network comprises three layers of neurodes: the input and output layers, and one hidden 
layer. When a neurode in the hidden or output layer receives signals from neurodes in the 
preceeding layer, it constructs a (linear) weighted average of those signals, and then 'squashes' 
this weighted average by putting it through a nonlinear transformation. The logistic 
transformation employed in equation (2) is typical. Intuitively, the end result is that output is a 
melange of nonlinear transformations of the input signals. Indeed, this melange is so rich that 
the neural network can serve as an approximator to any linear or nonlinear process. Put 
simply, it is not necessary to know the functional form of the relationship between inputs and 
outputs; the neural network can approximate it arbitrarily closely, whatever it is. 
 
The model in equation (2) is thus a single hidden layer feedforward network where a weighted 
average of the signals which emerge from the hidden layer is squashed, and where a squasher 
is also used to transform inputs into the hidden layer. In both cases the squashing function is 
the logistic. It has been shown by White et al. (1989) that such a neural network can 
approximate arbitrarily closely any underlying pattern in the data.  
 
Neural networks have come to be extensively used in a variety of contexts within economics 
over the past few years. First and foremost, they are used in time series work, and especially 
for forecasting. Swanson and White (1997) and Johnes (2000) respectively provide examples 
of neural network forecasting models of the US and UK economies. Cross-section 
  7applications of the method are somewhat less common in disciplines related to economics, but 
interesting examples include the work of Welch et al. (1998) in which networks are used to 
detect fraudulent behaviour in the procurement process for contracts in national defence. An 
excellent entry point to the literature on neural networks, which contains many key papers, is 
given by White (1992). In the present context, a simple neural network is preferable to a linear 
model which includes a full set of interaction terms for a number of reasons: the latter 
approach would be purely descriptive and would not throw any light on the nature of the 
synergies that are  implicit in the technology determining wages; degrees of freedom would be 
severely limited for many of the interaction dummies.  
 
An issue which arises in the context of neural network modelling is the problem of 
overfitting.
10 Since a sufficiently complicated network is capable of approximating any data 
set arbitrarily closely, the danger exists that the network might model noise as though it were 
signal. While this would result in a good fit to the historical data, it would also mean that the 
model is less than optimal in terms of its ability to capture the true nature of the relationship 
between dependent and explanatory variables; it would not be a good predictor out of sample.  
To guard against overfitting therefore, I choose a particularly parsimonious specification of 
the network, and so set m=1.
11  Note further that seventeen distinct types of A level 
qualification are reported in the data set. Five of these, however, were taken by fewer than 20 
respondents in the sample used below. These have been merged into a single variable 
representing the ‘number of other A levels taken’. This, together with the 12  remaining A 
level subject-specific binary variables leaves n=13 inputs to the nonlinear part of the neural 
                                                 
10 The parsimonious model employed here, however, is considerably less subject to the overfitting critique than 
would be a linear model with a full set of curriculum dummies. In fact the latter approach could not be used in 
the present exercise in any event because of the loss of degrees of freedom that would be entailed. 
11 Statistical tests for the irrelevance of hidden neurodes exist, but their development is embryonic and their 
power is unclear. See, for example, White (1989). 
  8network. The full specification of the model is therefore given by substituting (2) into (1) to 
yield 
 




The parameters of this model are estimated by ‘training’ the neural network. This involves an 
iterative process through which a measure of the model error is minimised. A variety of 




It should be noted at this stage, that the neural network model as applied in this context 
performs a function that is in many respects analogous to a model in which the vector of 
regressors includes a full set of interaction terms between A level subjects. The latter 
approach is clearly not feasible where many of the interaction terms would take zero value for 
all observations. This is not a problem with the neural network approach, however, because in 
essence the method fits a curve across all possible interactions. It uses the data on 3-tuples
13 
of subjects that are observed in the sample to provide predictions of the dependent variable for 
all possible 3-tuples (whether these are observed in the data or not). This allows an obvious 
economy in terms of degrees of freedom, and allows also predictions to be made about 
combinations of subjects that are not observed in the data - a feat that would be beyond the 
alternative approach of a linear model augmented by a full set of interaction terms. 
 
                                                 
12 I have retained linear terms in the equation, rather than placing these in a nonlinear framework, for two 
reasons. First, the primary interest of this paper is in the role of the A level curriculum and the possibility of 
synergies and nonlinearities therein. Secondly, maintaining a parsimonious specification of the controls guards 
against overfitting.  
13 Or, for individuals who take fewer than three A levels, 2-tuples or single subjects. 
  9Data 
The data are taken from stages 3 through 5, and also from the examinations files, of the 
National Child Development Study (NCDS). All children born in the United Kingdom during 
the week 3-9 March 1958 comprise the base for the NCDS. Parents of these children were 
surveyed in 1958 as the Perinatal Mortality Survey; they were later also surveyed in 1965, 
1969 and 1974, these being the first three stages of the NCDS proper. The fourth and fifth 
stages of the NCDS took place in 1981 and 1991; since the children born in 1958 were adults 
by the time these stages took place, the surveys were completed by them rather than by their 
parents. The fifth stage has been extensively used in labour market analyses, including   
Harmon and Walker (2000) and Blundell et al. (1997). 
 
The NCDS data are particularly notable in that they include comprehensive information about 
the educational qualifications earned by respondents. This includes full details of CSEs, O 
levels and A level subjects in which pass grades were obtained. The information about A 
levels forms the cornerstone of the analysis which follows. In addition, information on a large 
number of control variables is available from the NCDS. These include further information 
about the respondent (family background, innate ability, work history, household 
composition, health, area of residence), his or her employer (firm size, industry), and other 
controls.  
 
In discussions about wage equations, the issue of sample selection bias frequently arises, and 
this is especially so when the sample comprises women. The NCDS data are sufficiently rich 
to allow correction for sample selection effects following the approach of Heckman (1979). 
However, it is not at all clear how such effects can be washed out of the analysis using neural 
  10networks.
14 For this reason, and also because the number of females in the NCDS who were 
working at the time of the fifth sweep is rather small, the analysis reported in the present 
paper focuses exclusively on males.  
 
In Table 1, descriptive statistics are reported for variables used in the models that follow. 
These are based on the full sample of 1875 men for which complete data are available.
15 The 
mean hourly wage amounted to a little over £7 per hour (in 1991). On average, respondents 
had just over 2 O levels; but one half of the respondents have none at all. Some 18 per cent 
proceeded to earn at least one A level qualification, while 15 per cent earned a degree. Of this 
sample, 31 per cent  are employed in managerial or professional occupations, and a slightly 
higher proportion (34 per cent) are employed as craftsmen or operatives. Most of the 
remainder are in other manual occupations.
16 Just under 44 per cent of the sample are union 
members.   
                                                 
14 One possibility would be to follow Curry and Morgan (1997) and estimate a linear approximation to the neural 
network. The Heckman (1979) method could then be applied to this in the usual way. In the case of the present 
exercise, however, taking a Taylor expansion of the network with 17 subjects would involve an unacceptable 
loss of degrees of freedom. In order to ensure that the analysis for males is not biased due to sample selection 
effects, a variety of Heckman models have been estimated using the linear specification of the earnings equation 
with the number of children used as an identifier in the selector equation. The λ term in the outcome equation 
does not come close to significance, and indeed for most specifications of the selector equation its t statistic lies 
below 0.05. 
15 The NCDS contains about 17000 men and women. But there has been attrition between sweeps, and there is 
incomplete information on several of the variables included in the present analysis.  
16 This is the excluded group in our regressions, and refers to occupations in the 900 group of the Standard 
Occupational Classification. 
  11Results 
In the first column of Table 2 I report a simple linear specification of the model (1). This 
includes all men in the sample, whether or not they achieved A level qualifications.
17 The first 
column of this table provides a fairly parsimonious specification of the model in which A 
level curriculum and performance appears alongside information about higher education, 
health, family composition variables. The results are plausible and generally in line with other 
studies. Study of social science and mathematics at A level significantly enhances earnings, 
given the overall performance at this level as measured by A level points. Improved 
performance at A level, given curriculum, enhances earnings, but the level of significance of 
this coefficient is not terribly high; it falls just below 5 per cent on a one-tailed test. These 
results are very much in concord with the outcomes of previous studies. The results reported 
here suggest that there is a substantial and significant wage premium associated with a degree. 
As is often found in empirical studies, marriage enhances earnings for men (see, for example, 
Akerlof, 1998), and so does health.  
 
In the second column of Table 2, a simple control is introduced for ability - namely the 
number of O levels (or grade 1 CSEs) obtained. This affects the coefficients on the other 
education variables; as one might expect, it reduces their impact on earnings and reduces also 
their significance. The results suggest that each O level enhances earnings by about 5 per cent, 
while a degree adds around 15 per cent to earnings, other things being equal. Binary variables 
indicating whether or not an individual achieved an A level pass in each of a number of 
subjects appear as regressors, but now none is significant. This calls into question the 
specification of models in previous work examines curriculum without adequately controlling 
for prior educational performance. 
                                                 
17 This distinguishes the analysis from that of Dolton and Vignoles (2002a) who include in their sample only 
those who achieved at least one A level pass.  
  12 
Much of the recent literature on education concerns the possible endogeneity of schooling 
(Harmon and Walker, 1995). If individuals optimise their behaviour in a human capital model, 
then their choice of educational investment will depend on the return that they expect to get 
from that investment. Hence education is partly endogenous. The expected return from an 
educational investment depends, inter alia, on factors such as innate ability. Endogeneity bias 
therefore attaches to the coefficients on education variables if data limitations preclude the 
inclusion of ability in the analysis. In the present paper, I tackle the problem using two 
methods. First, I instrument for the schooling variables
18. The results of this exercise are 
shown in column 3 of Table 2.
19 The results are broadly similar to those obtained in the 
second column, but the coefficients on the O level and degree variables are now slightly 
raised, though less significant. 
 
The binary variables indicating subject choice at A level have not been instrumented in 
column 3. Despite extensive experimentation, a suitable set of instruments passing the 
Hausman (1978) test could not be found. In view of the rich variety of prior educational 
attainment data that are available in the NCDS data set, this suggests that endogeneity of 
curriculum choice is not a problem in these data. 
 
A number of further variables are added into the model in column 4.
20 These show that there 
is a firm size effect, such that larger firms pay higher wages. This accords with the literature 
on insider power in wage determination, in which workers use the monopoly power which 
                                                 
18 Number of O levels, A level points, and degree are instrumented using measures of prior educational 
attainment (reading and maths test scores at ages 7 and 11), secondary school type, and the social class of the 
main income earning parent.  
19 In this column, A level points no longer appears as a regressor owing both to its insignificance in the second 
column and difficulty in finding adequate instruments. 
20 In this column, I do not instrument for the schooling variables. 
  13their incumbency confers upon them to capture a share of the rents represented by company 
profits; an alternative interpretation of this finding is that dynamic monopsony results in firms 
facing an upward sloping labour supply schedule (Blanchflower et al., 1990; Green et al., 
1996; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997). Experience of unemployment serves to reduce an 
individual’s wage, and membership of a trade union enhances it (though only slightly and 
with an imprecisely estimated coefficient).  
 
There are a number of occupation and region effects which are, for the sake of conciseness, 
not reported in the table. Amongst manual workers, craftsmen are the best paid, receiving on 
average about 7 per cent higher earnings than the ‘other manual’ group. Apart from clerical 
workers, wages are higher for those employed in non-manual work than for others. This is 
especially so for those employed in managerial, professional and technical occupations, which 
are typically remunerated at a rate which is between 17 and 28 per cent higher than the ‘other 
manual’ category. Relative to London and the South East, wages are low in every region. 
These findings fit in well with casual observation. 
 
Including these extra variables in the equation has an impact on the coefficients of the 
education variables. The premium that attaches to the number of O levels obtained is now 
estimated at 3 per cent per O level, while the degree premium is around 13 per cent. These 
declines are not altogether surprising, since there is collinearity between education and 
occupation.  
 
The second method whereby possible biases in the coefficients on the education variables 
may be checked is to include as full as possible a set of regressors - including measures of 
innate ability (reading and mathematics test scores at ages 7 and 11) - in the equation. This is 
  14the approach adopted by Blundell et al. (2000) and is adopted here in column 5 of Table 2. 
This brings about a further fall in the coefficients on O levels and on degree, though in the 
latter case at least the drop is quite slight. 
 
Turn now to consider the neural network estimates. I report the results obtained from three 
specifications; in terms of the variables included in the analysis, these correspond to the final 
three columns of Table 2. The estimated parameters for the neural network models are 
reported in Table 3. It is easily seen that the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on all the 
controls (the variables in Z) are similar to those obtained in the corresponding linear 
regressions of Table 2.  
 
The coefficients on the nonlinear terms are not so easy to interpret, though, and as might be 
expected in a system of this kind, some of these coefficients are ticklish with respect to 
specification of the model. Table 4 is designed to facilitate understanding of some salient 
features of the results. It shows the wages predicted by the neural network model reported in 
the final column of Table 3,
21 for workers who studied a variety of curricula at A level, given 
mean values for all the Z variables.  
 
The pattern of predicted wages in Table 4 is complex. For instance, if French and History are 
studied at A level, then it makes no difference to the predicted wage whether the third subject 
studied is Mathematics or Social Science. If, on the other hand, it is studied in combination 
with Physics and Biology, then Social Science has a greater impact on the expected wage than 
does Mathematics. This results from the nonlinear and interactive structure of the neural 
network; rather than being linear as in a traditional regression approach, the impact on 
                                                 
21 An analogous table, constructed from the results in the first column of Table 3, yields qualitatively similar 
results. Unfortunately it is not possible to construct standard errors for the estimates provided in Table 4. 
  15predicted wages of a subject is dependent on the other subjects that are studied. Put simply, 
there are synergies which are allowed for (though not imposed) in the neural network model. 
 
Some interesting patterns can be observed in the results. A concentrated curriculum in either 
the (broadly defined) arts or the sciences may enhance wages - for instance, a curriculum of 
Physics, Chemistry and Biology yields a predicted wage of £7.69 per hour, and one of 
History, French and Art yields £7.68. On the other hand, there are examples of concentrated 
curricula that do not yield high expected returns: English, French and History yields a 
predicted wage of £6.59, while Mathematics, Statistics and Physics yields £6.60. Meanwhile 
there are many examples of curricula that straddle the boundary between arts and science 
subjects which are remunerative (French, History and Chemistry, for instance, gives a 
predicted wage of £7.66), but there are other examples where this is not the case (English, 
History and Physics offers £6.59). More important than deep or broad, clearly, is the precise 
mix of subjects studied. We do not as yet understand why some groups of subjects synergise 




Several of the combinations of subjects listed in Table 4 yield the same predicted wage. This 
is an unsurprising outcome of the nonlinear process which determines the wage in this model. 
If we think of combinations of subjects in terms of a single variable which is defined along a 
continuum from 'unfavourable' to 'favourable', then the relationship between that variable and 
earnings is generally positive, but becomes flat at the extremes. The predicted wages obtained, 
with mean values of all but the curriculum variables, range from £6.59 per hour to £7.69 
                                                 
22 It is now many years since Hanushek (1986) observed that our understanding of the 
educational production function was poor. The same remains true today. 
 
  16depending on the precise mix of subjects studied at A level, and there is bunching at each of 
these extremes. 
 
From the above, we would conclude that a curriculum is considerably more than the sum of 
its parts. There are synergies between subjects which are quite complex. Moreover, it does not 
make sense to talk of the desirability of a broad curriculum or of a deep curriculum 
independently of what subjects comprise that curriculum. The method advocated here allows 
this problem to be analysed using a specification of the model which is both neat and general. 
 
The linear models of Table 2 and the nonlinear models of Table 3 may be compared using a 
standard likelihood ratio test. This provides a test statistics of 3.92, 11.45 and 4.17 
respectively for the three columns of Table 3. All of these test statistics 4.10 exceed the 
critical value of χ21 = 3.84 at the 5 per cent level. Hence we may conclude that the neural 
network models dominate the corresponding linear specifications. Note that this also implies 
that the presence in the model of the melange of all A level subjects has a significant effect on  
earnings.
 23   
 
It was noted earlier that the neural network approach is similar in some respects to a model in 
which the regressors include a full set of interaction terms between subjects. In the data used 
for the full specification of the model in the final columns of Table 2, some 78 distinct 
combinations of (one, two or three) subjects are studied at A level by individuals in the 
sample. When a linear specification of the model is run with all these interactions included as 
                                                 
23 As noted by Coelli (1996) this likelihood ratio test is of more value than examination of the t ratios attached to 
individual coefficients in a nonlinear model. 
  17regressors, 12 of the interaction terms are significant at 5% or better.
24 Interestingly, amongst 
the combinations of subjects that significantly lower earnings are some that include maths, 
while amongst the combinations that significantly increase earnings are some that do not 
include maths. Of the 12 significant interaction terms, maths appears as a subject in only 4. 
These results confirm the findings of the neural network analysis that suggest that curriculum 




The results obtained above cast some doubt on the question of whether a linear specification 
for an earnings equation in which qualifications feature as regressors is correct. Such a 
specification does not admit the plausible scenario in which some groups of qualifications 
combine more effectively than do others to raise respondents’ earnings.  
 
If it is accepted that synergies exist between subjects studied within the curriculum – and the 
results obtained in the present paper indeed suggest that it should be – then the argument that 
curriculum does not matter must be jettisoned. This is a profound finding, because it has 
serious implications for the way in which we view the human capital versus sorting debate. 
The only serious evidence which supports sorting as opposed to the human capital model has 
come from linear regressions which seem to show that studying subjects while at school does 
not raise earnings, though actually being at school does. I have shown above, however, that 
the choice of subjects studied does affect earnings. Alongside the evidence in Wolpin (1977), 
                                                 
24 Those that negatively influence earnings are: French, modern languages and social science; French, modern 
languages and academic art; biology, maths and combined sciences; chemistry, geology and maths; chemistry, 
art and maths; French and social sciences; French and academic art; French; physics. Those that positively 
influence earnings are: social science and technology; social science and art; maths and physics. 
  18Cohn et al. (1987), Johnes (1998) and others, this is a telling blow against the empirical 
relevance of the sorting model.
25   
 
The fact that curriculum in general plays an important part in determining earnings outcomes 
of course implies that mathematics is not unusual in making a positive contribution to 
earnings. This too is an important finding, not least because it stands in sharp contrast to 
results from earlier studies which have used a linear estimation method. We may count 
amongst these earlier studies the results reported by Vignoles (1999) and Dolton and Vignoles 
(2002a,b) using the same data set as has been employed here. It would appear that the 
apparent high return to mathematics in these studies is a chimera due to the imposition of an 
excessively simple functional form. Other subjects matter too. 
 
The results have also enabled this paper to make a contribution to the depth versus breadth 
debate which is current in British educational research. In common with Dolton and Vignoles 
(2002b), I have been unable to find any general pattern which suggests that breadth of 
curriculum results in higher remuneration than does. However, my results also suggest that 
the breadth versus depth debate is something of a diversion. A broad curriculum is neither a 
good nor a bad thing. What matters is the precise mix of subjects that is studied within that 
curriculum. 
 
A distinctive feature of the present study is the methodology. While neural networks are not 
entirely unfamiliar to economists, their use in cross-section work has been very limited. I 
                                                 
25 It might be argued that employers use information about curriculum as a screen, and this (rather than any 
human capital explanation) is why curriculum affects earnings. But this argument runs counter to Altonji’s; his 
argument is that curriculum (a human capital measure) does not (in his analysis) affect earnings while years of 
schooling (a signal) does provides evidence for sorting. It does not seem reasonable to claim that curriculum 
serves as a measure of human capital in Altonji’s analysis (where it is insignificant) but as a measure of sorting 
in mine (where it is significant).  
  19would argue that much is to be gained from more extensive use of this tool of analysis. In the 
present context, for instance, the research could usefully be extended to examine the 
determination of women’s earnings (given adequate data). Elsewhere in labour economics, 




To conclude, the manner in which the curriculum studied at school affects future earnings is 
subtle and complex. Synergies between subjects exist, and it appears that some groups of 
subjects combine more productively than do others.  The next step in the research process 
should be to gain an understanding of why this should be the case. That, however, is one for 
the specialists in educational research. 
                                                 
26 For instance, there is a well documented nonlinear effect linking experience to earnings. Indeed, the quartic 
specification espoused by Murphy and Welch (1990) might neatly be viewed as a Taylor approximation to a 
neural network - which in turn serves as a (universal) approximator to the true relationship. 
  20Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean  Standard  deviation 
   
log of hourly wage  1.9612  0.4240 
number of O levels  2.4197  3.1214 
A level points  1.0965  2.9638 
professional qualification  0.1035  0.3046 
A levels:     
French 0.0149 0.1213 
Other modern language  0.0064  0.0798 
English 0.0149  0.1213 
History 0.0347  0.1830 
Biology 0.0315  0.1746 
Chemistry 0.0389  0.1935 
Geology 0.0043  0.0652 
Social Science  0.0400  0.1960 
Commerce 0.0027  0.0516 
Other mathematics  0.0011  0.0327 
Statistics 0.0021  0.0462 
Technical 0.0101  0.1002 
Art 0.0165  0.1275 
Academic Art  0.0245  0.1547 
Mathematics 0.0528  0.2237 
Physics 0.0507  0.2194 
Combined Sciences  0.0005  0.0231 
   
Degree 0.1493 0.3565 
Firm size 11-25 employees  0.1269  0.3330 
Firm size 26-99 employees  0.2400  0.4272 
Firm size 100-499 employees  0.2720  0.4451 
Firm size ≥500 employees  0.2464 0.4310 
Experience of unemployment  0.2432  0.4291 
Single 0.1957 0.3969 
Married 0.7008  0.4580 
North 0.0581  0.2341 
Yorkshire and Humberside  0.1019  0.3026 
East Midlands  0.0640  0.2448 
West Midlands  0.0949  0.2932 
East Anglia  0.0379  0.1909 
South East  0.2363  0.4249 
South West  0.0859  0.2802 
North West  0.1040  0.3053 
Wales 0.0560  0.2300 
Scotland 0.0917  0.2887 
Managerial 0.2197  0.4142 
Professional 0.0912  0.2880 
Technical 0.1008  0.3011 
  21Clerical 0.0693  0.2541 
Craft 0.2064  0.4048 
Personal services  0.0656  0.2476 
Sales 0.0405  0.1973 
Operatives 0.1419  0.3490 
Excellent health  0.3701  0.4830 
Disabled 0.0085  0.0920 
Union member  0.4395  0.4965 
 
Note: log wage has a range from 0.372 to 3.585; O levels has a range from 0 to 11; all other 
variables are binary. 
  22 Table 2 Regression results 
 
V a r i a b l e        
       
constant  1.821 1.767 1.681 1.541 1.391 
  (63.04) (63.07) (49.55) (24.92) (18.98) 
       
number of O 
levels 
  0.051 0.073 0.030 0.017 
   (12.80)  (13.42)  (7.23)  (3.76) 
       
A level points  0.010  0.007       
  (1.62) (1.26)      
       
A  level  French  -0.024 -0.132 -0.145 -0.067 0.085 
  (0.29) (1.69) (1.55) (0.84) (1.07) 
       
A level English  0.062  -0.022  0.070  0.080  0.074 
  (0.77) (0.28) (0.83) (1.10) (1.03) 
       
A  level  History  0.084 0.016 0.043 0.001 0.011 
  (1.39) (0.28) (0.66) (0.02) (0.21) 
       
A level Biology  0.076  -0.030  0.053  -0.032  -0.016 
  (1.21) (0.50) (0.77) (0.53) (0.27) 
       
A level 
Chemistry 
-0.059 -0.094 -0.060 -0.027 -0.036 
  (0.88) (1.45) (0.82) (0.43) (0.58) 
       
A level Social 
Science 
0.105 -0.018  0.078 0.029 0.024 
  (2.01) (0.35) (1.38) (0.61) (0.52) 
       
A level Statistics  0.033  -0.043  0.112  -0.006  0.040 
  (0.17) (0.23) (0.58) (0.04) (0.24) 
       
A level 
Technical 
0.141 0.015 0.026 -0.127  -0.122 
  (1.53) (0.17) (0.27) (1.49) (1.43) 
       
A level Art  0.024  -0.063  -0.001  -0.073  -0.076 
  (0.33) (0.88) (0.01) (1.12) (1.17) 
       
A level 
Academic Art 
0.102 -0.011  0.075 0.038 0.029 
  (1.54) (0.17) (0.96) (0.57) (0.44) 
       
A  level  0.117 0.012 0.049 0.019 0.018 
  23Mathematics 
  (1.98) (0.21) (0.77) (0.36) (0.33) 
       
A level Physics  0.039  -0.068  0.021  -0.030  -0.020 
  (0.65) (1.18) (0.33) (0.55) (0.37) 
       
number of other 
A levels 
0.069  -0.055 -0.016 -0.070 -0.074 
  (0.86) (0.71) (0.19) (0.96) (1.02) 
       
Degree  0.260 0.151 0.163 0.128 0.104 
  (8.00) (4.69) (1.78) (3.98) (3.22) 
       
Single  -0.066 -0.081 -0.069 -0.078 -0.069 
  (1.91) (2.44) (1.80) (2.32) (2.07) 
       
Married  0.067 0.057 0.081 0.036 0.047 
  (2.23) (1.97) (2.44) (1.23) (1.61) 
       
Excellent  health  0.103 0.085 0.086 0.050 0.051 
  (5.47) (4.72) (4.24) (2.78) (2.84) 
       
Disabled  -0.329 -0.298 -0.247 -0.117 -0.093 
  (3.37) (3.19) (2.28) (1.22) (0.97) 
       
Professional 
qualification 
   0.068  0.062 
     (2.27)  (2.07) 
       
Firm size 11-25        0.172  0.171 
     (4.95)  (4.93) 
       
Firm size 26-99        0.209  0.209 
     (6.82)  (6.84) 
       
Firm size 
medium 
   0.296  0.297 
     (9.70)  (9.81) 
       
Firm size big        0.314  0.314 
     (10.06)  (10.12) 
       
Been 
unemployed 
   -0.141  -0.131 
     (6.77)  (6.31) 
       
Union  member     0.016  0.011 
     (0.86)  (0.61) 
  24       
Regional 
dummies 
no no no 10 10 
Occupation 
dummies 
no no no 8  8 
       
number of 
observations 
1875 1875 1488 1488 1488 
R  squared 0.171 0.238 0.232 0.426 0.444 
log  likelihood  -875.61 -796.24 -631.31 -415.67 -391.79 
       
 
Note: t ratios in parentheses. Other variables included in the regression reported in the final 
column are: reading and mathematics test scores at ages 7 and 11; secondary school size and 
type; social class of main income earning parent. 
  25Table 3  Coefficient estimates for the neural networks 
 
Variable      
    
Constant 1.291  1.087  0.965 
 (23.88)  (15.98)  (12.86) 
    
Number of O levels  0.073  0.046  0.015 
 (13.71)  (9.24)  (3.56) 
    
Degree 0.179  0.087  0.089 
 (2.67)  (1.57)  (2.96) 
    
Single -0.068 -0.066 -0.069 
 (1.78)  (1.97)  (2.09) 
    
Married 0.081  0.057  0.049 
 (2.46)  (1.99)  (1.73) 
    
Excellent health  0.085  0.057  0.053 
 (4.21)  (3.26)  (3.03) 
    
Disabled -0.253  -0.107  -0.104 
 (2.35)  (1.13)  (1.11) 
    
Professional 
qualification 
 0.082  0.065 
  (2.78)  (2.25) 
    
Firm size 11-25    0.178  0.172 
  (5.21)  (5.08) 
    
Firm size 26-99    0.213  0.210 
  (7.07)  (7.02) 
    
Firm size medium    0.298  0.299 
  (9.97)  (10.12) 
    
Firm size big    0.318  0.317 
  (10.37)  (10.44) 
    
Been unemployed    -0.126  -0.132 
  (6.17)  (6.50) 
    
Union member    0.010  0.013 
  (0.53)  (0.73) 
    
Regional dummies  no  10  10 
  26Occupation dummies  no  8  8 
    
ρ -0.902  -0.757  -0.637 
 (2.60)  (2.98)  (3.07) 
    
θ associated with A 
level: 
   
    
French 27.11  1.020  2.028 
 (0.00)  (0.19)  (0.22) 
    
English -1.355  -12.083 -12.317 
 (0.39)  (0.15)  (0.09) 
    
History -15.85  -8.564  -7.521 
 (0.00)  (0.11)  (0.06) 
    
Biology -8.183  -3.703  11.792 
 (0.13)  (0.44)  (0.09) 
    
Chemistry 6.922  0.040  9.114 
 (0.11)  (0.01)  (0.09) 
    
Social Science  -8.256  -17.343  -11.942 
 (0.13)  (0.01)  (0.09) 
    
Statistics -8.598  1.638  3.576 
 (0.00)  (0.12)  (0.05) 
    
Technical 0.851  3.599  4.708 
 (0.28)  (0.50)  (0.12) 
    
Art 0.346  10.061  10.573 
 (0.18)  (0.13)  (0.08) 
    
Academic Art  0.579  -3.624  -10.490 
 (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.08) 
    
Mathematics -6.692  -6.459  -15.561 
 (0.11)  (0.58)  (0.11) 
    
Physics 1.438  4.006  5.913 
 (0.53)  (0.47)  (0.04) 
    
other subjects 
(number) 
-13.549 22.224  12.119 
 (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
    
  27number of 
observations 
1488 1488 1488 
R squared  0.234  0.430  0.445 
log likelihood  -629.35  -409.94  -389.70 
    
 
  28Table 4 Examples of the neural network results 
 
Curriculum  Predicted wage (£/hr) 
    
English History Physics 6.59 
English French  History 6.59 
Mathematics French  History  6.59 
Social Science  French   History  6.59 
Mathematics Statistics  Physics  6.60 
English French  Art  7.18 
Mathematics Physics  Biology  7.56 
Social Science  Physics  Biology  7.69 
French History  Chemistry  7.66 
English Physics    Biology 7.68 
History French  Art  7.68 
Physics Chemistry  Biology 7.69 






Figure 1: Diagrammatic representation of a neural network
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